印度观察家研究基金会-监管国有跨国企业的全球框架（英）-2021.11-13正式版.docx

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1、Speciak闻尼地GlobalFrameworkforRegulatingState-OwnedMultinationalEnterprisesAkshayMathur2021ObserverResearchFoundation.llrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced,copied,archived,reUinedortransmittedthroughprint,speechorelectronicmediawithoutpriorwrittenapprovalfromORF.AbstractTheIMFestimat

2、esthatState-OwnedEnterprise(SOE)assetstotalledUS$45trillionin2018,closeto50%oftheglobalGDP,andcalculatedthedebtofthelargestSOEstobeUS$7.4trillion.Clearly,SOEshaveadirectbearingontheglobaleconomy.ThemostsystemicallyimportantSOEsaretheState-OwnedMultinationalEnterprises(SOMNEs)sincetheyarefocusedoncro

3、ss-borderfinancingandbusiness.AglobalframeworkforregulatingSOMNEsisneeded,onethatdefinesSOMNEsclearly,enforcestransparencyandownershipofbusinessaccounts,mapscross-borderfinancialinterlinkages,andrequiresregularexercisesonfinancialstability.Attribution:AkshayMathur,uGIobaIFrameworkforRegulatingState-

4、OwnedMultinationalEnterprises,ORFSpecialReportNo.166,November2021,ObserverResearchFoundation.ChallengeSOMNEsaredeeplyentrenchedintheinternationalfinancialandtradingsystem.Theiroperationsimpactglobalsupplychains,capitalflowsandmacroeconomicpolicy.Yet,thereisnouniversalframeworkforgoverningmultination

5、alSOEs.ThemismanagementofSOMNEscanbeamajorrisktotheglobaleconomyandmayspawnaglobalfinancialcrisis.The G20 can create a framework that helpsIdentify a SOMNEDocuments cross-border linkages and systemic risks for each SOMNEEnsures that SOMNE activities are monitored regularlyProposalSinceSOMNEshaveadir

6、ectbearingontheglobaleconomy,particularlyfinancialstability,itisnaturalthateffortstodesignuniversalrulesfortheirgovernanceshouldbeledbytheG20.Withoutgloballyacceptedprudentialnorms,SOMNEsmayprovetobeasystemicriskfortheinternationalfinancialsystem.DataonSOMNEsislimited,butsincetheyoperateinthesamemar

7、ketplaceasprivateenterprise,theyshouldbesubjectedtosimilarrulesontransparencyasmultinationalcorporations.AgoodstartingpointistousetheregulationsandstandardsthatexistforSOEs.AsperanIMFreport,theshareofSOEassetsamongsttheworlds2,000largestfirmsisnearly20%;atUS$45trillionin2018,theseaccountfor50%ofglob

8、alGDP.ThesamereportestimatesthedebtofthelargestSOEstobeUS$7.4trillion.SOEsarepresentacrossthedevelopedanddevelopingeconomies.SomeofthelargestandmostvibrantSOEscanbefoundinGermany,France,Norway,Italy,China,India,Brazil,Malaysia,Indonesia,andSaudiArabia.Theyarespreadacrosssectorssuchasfinance,utilitie

9、s,energy,transport,andcommunicationinbothdevelopedanddevelopingcountries.ChineseSOEsarealwaysunderthescannerforpotentialcross-bordersystemicrisksgiventhescaleoftheenterprisesandtheirinterlinkageswiththeglobaleconomy.Therearenearly150,000SOEsinChina,accountingfornearlyUS$22trillioninassets,manyofthem

10、withinternationalbusinessoperations.SovereignWealthFunds(SWFs)areanotherformofSOMNEswhosefinancialsustainabilitycanhaveseriousimplicationsfortheglobaleconomy.InOctober2008,theSWFsvoluntarilypublishedthelSantiagoPrinciplestoguide“transparency,governance,accountability,andprudentinvestmentpractices.Ye

11、t,concernsaboutSWFs,systemicrisksremainduetothesheersizeandscaleoftheirpresence.APIIEreportestimatedthattheassetsundermanagementof37SWFsitexaminedin2008wasnearlyUS$2.6trillion,butby2019thescalehadreached64SWFswithassetsworthUS$8.1trillion(Maire,etal2021).3SWFshavealsobeenwithdrawingtheirassetstotide

12、overfiscaldeficitsduetoCOVID-19andthedropinoilprices,bothofwhichmayhaveimplicationsfortheglobaleconomy.Definingastate-ownedmultinationalenterpriseAfirststepforregulatingSOMNEsistohaveagloballyaccepteddefinitionforthem.ThisisdifficultbecausethereisyetnoglobaldefinitionforSOEseither.Nevertheless,somei

13、nternationalinstitutionsandplurilateralinitiativeshaveattemptedrecentlytodefineSOEs.Forinstance,theTranspacificPartnership(TPP)definesanSOEas:Anenterprisethatisprincipallyengagedincommercialactivitiesinwhichaparty(government): directlyownsmorethan50%ofthesharecapital controls,throughownershipinteres

14、ts,theexerciseofmorethan50%ofthevotingrights,or holdsthepowertoappointamajorityofmembersoftheboardofdirectorsoranyotherequivalentmanagementbodyTheIMFdefinesapubliccorporationas“entitiesthatarecontrolled-directlyorindirectlybythegovernmenwiththefollowingcriteriatomeasuregovernmentcontrol: ownershipof

15、themajorityofthevotinginterest controloftheboardorothergoverningbody controloftheappointmentandremovalofkeypersonnel controlofkeycommitteesoftheentity ownershipofgoldensharesandoptions capacitytochangeregulation controlbyadominantpublicsectorcustomerorgroupofpublicsectorcustomers,and controlattached

16、toborrowingfromthegovernmentTheWorldBankdefinesthepublicsectorasconsistingofthefollowingtypesofinstitutions:CentralgovernmentsandtheirdepartmentsPoliticalsubdivisionssuchasstates,provinceandmunicipalitiesCentralbanksAutonomousinstitutions,suchasfinancialandnon-financialcorporations,commercialanddeve

17、lopmentbanks,railways,utilities,etc.,where:- Thebudgetoftheinstitutionissubjecttotheapprovalofthegovernmentofthereportingcountry;or- Thegovernmentownsmorethan50%ofthevotingstockormorethanhalfofthemembersoftheboardofdirectorsaregovernmentrepresentatives;or- Incaseofdefault,thestatewouldbecomeliablefo

18、rthedebtoftheinstitution.AglobaldefinitionforSOMNEscanbeproducedbyusingtheTPP,IMFandWorldBankdefinitionsofpublic-sectorcompaniesasthebaseandaddingselectextraindicatorsthatrepresenttheirmultinationalnature.Forinstance,adefinitionforSOMNEscanbecreatedbyaddingthefollowingattributes: Shareofrevenueearne

19、dfromforeignoperations(toidentifySOMNEsbytheirinternationalbusinessoperations) Shareofassetsandliabilitiesattributedtoforeignentities(toidentifySOMNEsbytheirglobalinvestorsandcross-borderacquisitions)Withsuchauniversaldefinition,itwillbecomeeasiertoidentifySOMNEsaswellastheirgeographicconcentration,

20、sovereignaffiliation,marketintegration,andsupplychaindependencies.Disclosureofdatabystate-ownedmultinationalenterprisesTransparencyanddisclosurearenotnewpursuitsbutthequestforbetterdataandSUrVe川ancehasbecomeevenmorecriticalgiventheweakeningfiscalsituationofmanynations.Expertshavewarnedhowexternalbor

21、rowingbystate-owned(orguaranteed)enterpriseshasincreaseddrasticallybutthereportinghasnotkeptpace(Pazarbasiogluetal2021).4ExistinginitiativesondisclosurerequirementsforSOEsareusuallymotivatedbythefollowing: ForCorPoralegovernance：Theseincludeguidelinesandinitiativesthatfocusoncurbingcorruptionandimpr

22、ovingcorporategovernancetoensurefirm-levelresilienceandstability.Theseguidelinestypicallyareapplicablefornational,subnationalandevenlocalSOEs. FOrSVStemiCaIIVimportantfinancialinsiiiutions：Theseincludetheguidelinesandinitiativesundertakenbypublicandprivatebanksafterthetrans-Atlanticcrisisof2008ontSy

23、stemicallyImportantFinancialInstitutions(SIFIs)1,particularlytheworkdonebytheFinancialStabilityBoard,IMF,andBankofInternationalSettlementsinupgradingstandardsfordisclosureandresiliency.Sincedisclosurenormsforpublicly-listedSOEs,particularlythoseinthefinancialservices,areclearlyestablishedandenforced

24、byfinancialmarketregulators,thefocusofthisproposalisonthenon-lisled,government-supportedSOMNEs.TheWorldBankandIMFhaveestablishedregulationsfordisclosingdataondebtbutnonespecificallyforSOEs(orSOMNEs).Theguidelinesinplacetodaytreatofficial(bilateralandmultilateral)andprivateSOMNEsalike.Inthewakeofthep

25、andemicandtheworkbeingdonebytheIMFandWorldBanktoassistnationswitheconomicrecovery,thereisarenewedfocusondebtdisclosure.Therefore,thetimeisripetoestablishspecificregulationsfordisclosureofinformationforSOMNEs.ItwillhelpG20-ledinitiativessuchastheDebtServiceSuspensionInitiative(DSSI),whichisworkingond

26、evelopinga,commonframeworkbetweenlendersfromParisClubandNon-ParisClubnationstoprovidedebtrelieftothemostvulnerablenations.TheG20cancraftguidelinesfor: DiSCloSUreOfCrOSS-borderODrraIionSbySe)MNES(forinstance,foreigncurrency-denominatedfinancingbySOMNEstoprivateorpublicfirmsforprojectfinancingforinfra

27、structure)tosovereigns,sub-sovereignsandpublicsectorentities(orborrowerswithpublicguarantees)ondisclosinginformationsuchasinterestrates,maturityanduseofproceeds.AnysuchguidelineforSOMNEswillhavetobeprecededbyguidelinesthataccuratelydistinguishsovereignlendersandborrowersfromtrulyprivatelenders.TheWo

28、rldBankInternationalDebtStatistics2021estimatesthatthetotalexternaldebtstockoflow-incomecountrieseligibleforDSSIwasUS$744billionin2019.Ofthis,lendingfromprivatecreditorstoDSSI-eligiblecountrieswasUS$102billion.TheWorldBankDebtorReportingSystemrequirestheborrowingnationtoreportthenameofthecreditornat

29、ionandcreditinginstitutionextendingtheloanforpublicandpubliclyguaranteedloancommitments.ItisamethodologydescribedintheSystemofNationalAccounts(SNA2008)andtheIMFBalanceOfPaymentsmanual(BPM6). DiSCloSUreOfCreditgivenOrtakenbySOMNES(e.g.lendersOrborrowers)TheVoluntaryPrinciplesforDebtTransparencypublis

30、hedbytheInstituteforInternationalFinanceisagoodframeworktobuildon.ItprovidesguidelinesonforeigncurrencylendingYet,SOEsseemtofindloopholes.Forinstance,theWorldBankDebtorReportingSystem(DRS)Manuakdesignatesallcommercialbanksaspubliciftheyaredebtorsbutprivateiftheyarecreditors,asaresultofwhichcrediting

31、commercialbanksareoutsidethescopeofdebtdatareporting.Thisneedstochange.ExpertsfromtheBruegelhavehighlightedhowthemisclassificationofbankshascontributedtotheslowuptakeofG20,sDSSI(Bery,Herrero,Weil,2021).7AreportbytheGroupofThirtyunderlinedtheimportanceofdisclosurebyhighlightinghowsomenationsareunder-

32、reportingtheirpublicborrowingandforeigncurrencyexposurebyborrowingthroughtheirSOEs(forinstance,state-backedoilcompanies)Sofar,therisksposedbySOEshaveremainedwithinnationalboundaries.Forinstance,PIIEexpertreportedthatSOEsinChinadefaultedon80bondsworthnearlyUS$15billionduetofiscalconstraintsandthegove

33、rnment,sugradualphaseoutofgovernmentguaranteesonstatefirmliabilities(HuangT,2021)Thereportexplainedthecross-borderimplicationsforthesedefaultswerelikelytobelimitedsinceforeigninvestorsholdlittleinChinascorporatebondmarket.Similarly,thecaseofMozambiqueismostreadilycitedtoillustratehowdebtcanbe*hidden

34、,despiteguidelinesondebttransparency.AspertheIMF,Mozambiquedidnotdisclosetoittwostate-backedguaranteesworthUS$1.15billion(9%ofGDPin2015)providedtoSOEsregisteredasprivateenterprises.SincetheSOEsweredesignatedasprivateenterprisesandmoneywasdirectlytransferredtocontractors,dataontheloansnevermadeittoth

35、edisclosures.oWhentheloanswereeventuallydiscovered,therevelationjoltedthefinancialmarkets,leadingtoasharpspikeinbondyields.RequiringSOMNEStouseIeisforallcross-borderfinancialtransactionsFinally,howeffectivelySOMNEscanberegulatedgloballywilldependontheenforcementmechanism.Whatiseventuallyneededisreal

36、-time,enforcementandtoavoidanydependenceonself-reportingbySOEs.TheLegalEntityIdentifier(LEI),mandatedbytheG20andoverseenbytheGlobalLegalEntityIdentifierFoundation,canbemademandatoryforallcross-borderfinancialtransactionsundertakenbySOMNEs.WithLEItracking,BeneficialOwnershipinformationwillalsobecomep

37、ossible,whichcanhelptraceandmonitortheSOMNEs,activities.Sincethecentralbanksareusuallyresponsibleforregulatingcross-borderfinancialtransactions,theycanenforcetheuseofLEIsoncross-bordercreditrelatedtransactionsonboththelenderandtheborrower.ArelatedproposaltotheG20oncreatingaglobalframeworkforBenefici

38、alOwnershipwrittenbypolicyexpertsisinthepublicdomain(Vaidyanathanetal).AppendixRegulatoryFrameworkDateLeadinstitutionHighlightsandexcerptstakenfromofficialdocumentsReformofthePolicyonPublicDebtLimitsinFund-SupportedProgramsNov,2020IMFBetterdebtdisclosuretotheIMF,includinginformationoncreditorcomposi

39、tion,profileoftheholdersofthecountryspublicdebt,dataondebtserviceinadditiontodebtstock,dataondebtsubjecttonon-disclosureagreements,clarityindefiningthedistributionofcommercialandwofficia,creditorsPublicSectorDebtdefinitionsandreportinginlow-incomedevelopingcountriesJan31,2020IMFandWBGuidelinesondiff

40、erentreportingrequirementsfromIMFandWorldBankIDANon-ConcessionalBorrowingPolicySep24,2019WBPublicdebtstatisticssufferfromlimiteddebtdatacoverageanddebttransparency.ThisisespeciallythecasefordebtstoSOEs,contingentliabilitiesrelatedtoPublicPrivatePartnerships(PPPs),andcollateraliseddebt.GuidelinesonAn

41、ti-CorruptionandIntegrityinState-OwnedEnIerPriSeSMay2019OECDPreventionofcorruptionandguidelinesforaccountabilityVoluntaryPrinciplesforDebtTransparencyJun10,2019IIFProvidesguidelinesonforeigncurrencylendingtosovereigns,sub-sovereignsandpublicsectorentities(orborrowerswithpublicguarantees)ondisclosing

42、informationsuchasinterestrates,maturityanduseofproceedsRecommendationofthecouncilonsustainablelendingpracticesandofficiallysupportedexportcreditsJun8,2018OECDGuidelinesonprovidingofficialexportcreditstopublicobligorsorpubliclyguaranteedobligorsinlowerincomecountriesG20NotesonStrengtheningPublicDebtT

43、ransparencyJun14,2018IMFandWBGuidelinesondebtmanagementanddebtdatatransparencyRegulatoryFrameworkDateLeadinstitutionHighlightsandexcerptstakenfromofficialdocumentsG20High-LevelPrinciplesforPreventingCorruptionandEnsuringIntegrityinState-OwnedEnterprises2018G20Preventionofcorruptionandcorporategovern

44、anceofSOEsG2()OperationalGuidelinesforSustainableFinancingMar,2017IMFGuidelinesontransparencyofcreditorsinthreeareas:1)disclosureonlending,contracts,2)fiscaltransparency,debtmanagement3)debtrestructuringConsolidatedPrinciplesonPromotingResponsibleSovereignLendingandBorrowingJan1(),2012UNCTADGuidelin

45、esondisclosinginformationabouttermsandconditionsofthefinancingagreementbythesovereignborrower.Also,disclosureofdataonexternalanddomesticdebt,externalaccounts,derivativepositions,sovereignguarantees.PrinciplesforstablecapitalflowsandfairdebtrestructuringinemergingmarketsMar31,200511FDisclosureofovera

46、lleconomicsituation,levelsofindebtedness,balanceofpayments,interestrateandmaturityofallexternalfinancialsovereignobligationsChapter17-State-OwnedEnterprisesandDesignatedMonopoliesCPTPPDefinesastate-ownedenterpriseandinstrumentslike,non-commercialassistance.Rulesfornon-discriminatorytreatment,commerc

47、ialconsiderations,non-commercialassistanceDefinesadverseaffectsofnon-commercialassistanceRulesfortransparency,includingpublicdeclarationofstate-ownedenterprisesandThisreportwasfirstpublishedinSeptember2021asapolicybriefforT20ItalyunderTF9-InternationalFinance,https:/www.t20italy.org/20210827global-f

48、ramework-for-regulating-state-owed-multinatioal-enterprises-somnes/10Endnotes1 IMF,State-OwnedEnterprises:TheOtherGovernment,Chapter3,Pg49,https:/www.imf.Org/media/Files/Publications/fiscal-monitor/2020/April/English/ch3.ashx2 InternationalForumofSovereignWealthFunds,SantiagoPrinciples,https:/www.ifswf.org/santiago-principles-landing/santiago-principlestext=The%20Santiago%20Principles%20consists%20of1deeper%20understanding%20of%20SWF%20activities.