规划中非关系的未来：非洲大陆如何受益（英）-南非国际事务研究所-2021.10-34正式版.docx

OccasionalPaperMappingtheFutureofChina-AfricaRelations:HowtheContinentcanBenefitYlKEFU&OVIGWEEGUEGUAfrican perspectivesGlobal insightsSA%SOVTMMRKANlNSlfnZTtWyOFINIBtNAnOHAlAFFAftSJAbstractChinaisAfrica'slargesttradingpartner,anddeeperChina-Africaengagementhasthepotentialtotransformthecontinentstrade.TheestablishmentoftheAfricanContinentalFreeTradeArea(AfCFTA)issettoaddsignificantlytothisevolution,particularlyasmostoftheAfricancountriesthathaveratifiedtheagreementunderpinningthefreetradeareaarealsosignatoriestotheChinese-ledBeltandRoadInitiative.ThispavesthewayforgreaterstrategiccooperationbetweenAfricaandChinaintheareaoftrade,withmanyinfrastructuredevelopmentprojectsthathavebeencarriedoutundertheauspicesoftheBeltandRoadInitiativeprovidinganimportantfoundationfortradeexpansiononthecontinent.However,todate,China-Africaengagementhasbeenrelativelyadhocanduncoordinated,anditseffectsandbenefits(especiallyfromAfrica,sperspective)difficulttodetermine.ThispaperevaluatesthepotentialforgreatercoordinationbetweentheAfCFTAandtheBeltandRoadInitiativebyexaminingfourcooperationapproaches:(1)the*business-as-usuaor'statusquo,optioninwhichtheChina-Africarelationship(helpedbyChineseFDIflowstoAfrica)willcontinuetoevolveandtwo-waytradewillincreasebutinanadhocmanner;(2)greatercoordinationbetweentheAfCFTAandBeltandRoadInitiative,involvingthechannellingofChineseFDIintoprioritycountriesandsectorsinAfricaandsupportedbytheestablishmentofeconomiczones;(3)managedeconomicintegrationbetweentheAfCFTAandtheBeltandRoadInitiativeandapreferentialtradeframework,modelledalongthelinesoftheUSAfricanGrowthandOpportunityAct,withsignificantopportunitiesforChineseFDIineconomiczonesinAfrica;(4)afreetradeagreementbetweenChinaandtheAfricanContinentalFreeTradeArea.Eachoftheseoptionshasadvantagesanddrawbacks,whiletheirfeasibilityalsovaries.Drawingonthecomparativeassessment,thepaperofferscertainrecommendationstoAfricanpolicymakersandotherstakeholdersfortakingChina-Africarelationstothenextlevel,withthefreetradeagreementandBeltandRoadInitiativeactingasimportantpillarsinthetwosides*futureengagements.IntroductionIn2018,theDeclarationandActionPlanfortheSeventhForumonChina-AfricaCooperation(FOCAC)madethefirstdirectreferencetotheAfCFTA1whichbecameoperationalon1January2021.ItalsopubliclyannouncedtheclosealignmentoftheBeltandRoadInitiative(BRI)withtheAfricanUnion(AU)Agenda2063andthedevelopmentstrategiesbyallAfricancountries.AsChinaandAUsignedacooperationplanfortheBRIandAUAgenda2063inDecember2020,linkingtheBRIandtheAfCFTAwillbeakeythemeofFOCAC8in2021.Asof30January2021,140countriesand31internationalorganisationshadsignedcooperationdocuments(MemorandaofUnderstanding)withChinaontheBRI,amongwhichwere46Africancountries.Furthermore,36AfricancountrieshavedepositedtheirinstrumentsofratificationofAfCFTAwiththeAUCommission.Ofthe36countries,29arealsosignatoriestotheBRI.Giventhesignificantoverlapinsignatories,bothChinaandAfricangovernmentshaveanincentivetoconsiderhowtoleveragetheirtradelinkagesamongsignatorycountriesandhowinfrastructureprojectswilldirectlyenhancetradeconnectivity,thusmakingFOCAC2021animportantplatformforexchangingideasanddiscussingspecificconcernsaswellasflagshipprojectsthatwilllinktheBRIandAfCFTA.BothChinaandAfricangovernmentshaveanincentivetoconsiderhowtoleveragetheirtradelinkagesamongsignatorycountriesandhowinfrastructureprojectswilldirectlyenhancetradeconnectivityThereareseveralwaysinwhichtheBRIandAfCFTAcouldbelinkedgoingforward.Inthispaper,weappraisethepotentialoffouroptionsforfutureengagement:a*business-as-usuaor*status-quo,fairlyuncoordinatedbaselineoption;twotypesoftargetedandstructuredapproachestotradecooperation;andafullliberalisationoption,ie,anAfCFTA-ChinaFreeTradeAgreement(FTA).Weuseanadaptedstrengths,weaknesses,opportunitiesandthreats(SWOT)frameworktoexploretheprosandconsofeachoptioninaconsistentmanner.WealsoincorporatetheresultsofagravitymodelofAfrica-Chinatradeaswellascasestudiesontwosectors-manufacturingandagriculture-toexplaininmoreliteraltermsthepotentialforinnovative,strategictradecooperationandcollaborationbetweenChinaandAfrica.BasedonthisappraisalandinviewoftheupcomingFOCACin20211wethenproviderecommendationsfortheAU,Africangovernments,Africancivilsocietyandthinktankstomakeoneormorepreferredoptionsareality.Specifically,weurgeallthepartiestotakefulladvantageofthesynergiesbetweentheBRIandAfCFTAinnewandinnovativeways,whilelearningfrompastexperiencesandinteractionswithotherdevelopmentpartners.Cost-benefitanalysisTodate,mostoftheanalysisrelatedtotheimpactoftheBRIonthecontinenthasfocusedontheBRspotentialeffectoninfrastructure.Indeed,asthemainpurposeoftheBRIistostrengthenlinkagesonatranscontinentalscale,thereisnodoubtthatmostoftheprojectsarefocusedonlogisticsandtransportationinfrastructure,includingthebuildingofroads,railways,andmarineandairlinks.AccordingtoYiGang,thegovernorofthePeople,sBankofChina,Chinesefinancialinstitutionshavefunded$440billion-worthofinfrastructureprojectswithintheBRIcountries,manyofwhichareinAfrica. Sina Finance News, ,The Governor of People's Bank of China: Chinese financial institutions have funded S440 billion worth of infrastructure projects within the BRI countries,' April 25, 2019, httD-oW2019-04-25doc-ihvhiax4950924.shtml.Inaddition,theRefinitivdatabaseshowsthattransportation(38%),powerandwater(23%),andoilandgas(22%)arethetopthreesectorsinBRIprojects,followedbymanufacturing(9%),realestate(5%),mining(2%)andcommunication(1%). Refinitiv1 'BRI Connect: An Initiative in Numbers, 4m Edition: The impact of pandemics on infrastructure projects,' rVd, https:"WWW.refiniliv.coVconlentdammareHnen usdocumeNsaledreoortsybelt-and-road-issue-4-imDaCl-Of-DandembCon- infrastructure-proiects.pdf.BasedonajointstatementpublicisedattheendoftheSecondBeltandRoadForuminBeijingin2019, Xinhua, ,A Joint Statement of the Second Belt and Road FOaJm for International Cooperation (Full Text),' The Second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation. April 28.2019, hlto:/WWW.brfmc2019.c446.shtm1.andasshowninAnnexI,therewereseven(outof35)highlightedeconomiccorridorsandotherprojectsinAfricaundertheBRI,withalmostallofthemsomehowlinkedtotransportdevelopment.Theseeconomiccorridorsandprojects See Annex I for the full list of economic rridors and projects that were highlighted in the Second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation.areimportantwaysofprovidingadequateinfrastructureinAfricancountriessothattheycanpromotetrademoreeffectively,achievethefreemovementofpeopleandultimatelydeveloptheireconomies.However,whilebeneficialfortheAfCFTA,thesedevelopmentsandtheireffectshavecomeaboutinarelativelyadhoc,uncoordinatedmanner-particularlyfromtheAfricanside.ThispaperappraisesthepotentialfordeepercoordinationbetweentheBRIandAfCFTAbyexaminingthreenewoptionsforcollaboration,comparingthemagainsteachother,andalsoagainstwhatcanbecalleda,business-as-usuabaseline-inotherwords,nofurther,specificcoordinationorcooperationbetweentheBRIandAfCFTA.ThefourassessedoptionsareshowninFigure1.Figure1FrameworkfortheanalysisSource:Authors'compilationOption1:Adhoc5uncoordinatedcooperationbetweentheBRIandAfCFTADescriptionAlthoughChinaandtheAUhavesignedacooperationplantopromotetheBRIandtheAU,sAgenda2063,itispossiblethatthismaynotleadtoanyfurther,specificcooperation.Thiscanbethoughtofasthe*business-as-usuaor,status-quo,option,astheinteractionstodatebetweentheBRIandAfCFTAhavenotbeencharacterisedbyanyspecial,formalmechanismsorambitions,beyondbroadrecognitionintheFOCAC2018DeclarationandActionPlan. Yike Fu and Ovigwe Eguegu, "China's BRI and the AfCFTA: Potential Overlaps, Complementarities and Challenges" (Policy Insights 113, June 2021), htts:SaiiaQr.zaresearchchinas-bri-ad-lhe-afcfta-Dtenlial-ovedapscomDlemeniarilies-andchallenes.OpportunitiesUnderthisoption,basedonprevioustrends,itislikelythattradeandfinancebetweenChinaandAfricancountrieswillcontinuetogrow.Withregardtofinance,itislikelythatconcessionalloansfromChinawillcontinuetoflowtowardsAfrica,althoughcommentatorsaredividedonwhetherthiswillbeataslowerpacethanbeforeorwhethermomentumcanbemaintainedpost-COVID-19. Kevin Acker and Deborah Brautigam, 'Twenty Years of Data on China's Africa Lending," (Briefing Paper No. 4, China-Africa Research Initiative, South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, 2021), https:StatiCLSaUareSD 5652847de4bO33f56d2bdc29%6O5cbl 891 CbOO5747bl 2167/1616687497984BP+4+-+Acker%2C+Brautiam+-+20+Years+of+Data+ on+African+Lending.Ddf.Ourassessmentisthatsuchloanswillcontinue,althoughtheymaybedirectedatdifferentsectors,suchascommunications, Hannah Ryder, 'Africa's relationship with China must be more strategic in 20211' African Business, February 25, 2021, htt。S:african. business202l02lechnoQQv-informalionafricas-reationshiD-with-china-mus 卜 be-more-strate CIiC-in-2021/.whileAfricancountriesclassifiedas,debtdistressed'bytheInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF)mayfeelunderpressuretoavoidnewChineseloans.Foreigndirectinvestment(FDI)isalsolikelytoincreasebutatapacethatmirrorsthatofotherforeigninvestorsinAfricancountries,suchthatChineseFDIstocksinAfricacouldreach$100billionby2025,fromaround$4billionin2019. In the absence of modelling, we calculate a historic 15% annual growth rate and project this forward based on the data from the Johns Hopkins China-Africa Research Initiative, Data: Chinese Investment in Africa,' ht:"WWW.sais-cari.org/ChineSeinvestment-in-afica.IfAfrica'sotherdevelopmentpartners1.oanswillcontinue,althoughtheymaybedirectedatdifferentsectors,suchascommunications,whileAfricancountriesclassifiedas*debtdistressed,bytheIMFmayfeelunderpressuretoavoidnewChineseloansdonotincreasetheirFDIstocksonthecontinent,thiswillmoveChinafromfifthlargesttothetopinvestorinAfrica,followedbytheNetherlands. UN Conference on Trade and Development. 'Investment flows in Africa set to drop 25% to 40% in 2020', UNCTAD. 16 June 2020,httos:。UnetadQrqnewsinvestment-flows-africa-sekdroD25-402220.Furthermore,whileBRIloansmaybedirectedatawiderangeofAfricancountries,astheyarenow,FDIwilllikelybeconcentratedinparticular,high-growth,countries.Underthisoption,then,tradetrendswithChinawillcontinuetobedrivenbychangesinloansandFDI.ThereislikelytobecontinuedmoderategrowthbothinChineseexportstoAfricaandinexportsfromAfricatoChina,withthelatter-asisthecasenow-remainingfocusedonrawmaterialsandagriculturalproductsaslogisticsimprove,andtheformerremainingfocusedonmanufacturedgoods.TheremaybeashiftawayfromChineseimportstowardsAfricanmanufacturedgoodsascross-continentalvaluechainsdevelopincertainsectorsinthewakeoftheAfCFTA,butthiswillbeslowasChina,scurrentmanufacturingcomponentofFDIintoAfricaisfairlylow(12%).ChallengesItisalsopossiblethatsomepolicydecisionsmaysoonbetakenontheAfricansidethatwillaffectAfrica'stradewithChina,andthereforetheBRI.Notably,oneofthegreatestconcernsregardingChina'sinteractionswiththeAfCFTAtodaterelatestotheroleofrulesoforigin(ROOs). Tralac1 'Rules of Origin key to success of African Continental Free Trade Area,' June 27, 2019, https:/WWW.traac.OraMewsfarticle/ 1412O rules-of-oriin-kev-to-success-of-african-coniinental-free-trade-area.himl.ROOshavebeendescribedasthe'passportenablinggoodstocirculatedutyfreewithinafreetradeareaaslongasthesegoodsqualifyasoriginatingwithintheFTA,. UNCTAD, Rules of Origin Key to Success of African Continental Free Trade Area,' June 26, 2019, https:"UnCtad.orqnewsrules-oriqin -kev- SUCCeSS-africancontinetaLfreetradearea.Inotherwords,theyseektoensurethatproductsaretruly,madeinAfrica*.Thiswillenablegoodstoqualifyforpreferentialtradeconditions(ie,zeroimporttariffs)undertheAfCFTA.Asthingsstand,Africannationshavenegotiatedfor90%oftradetariffsongoodstobeeliminated.Fortheremaining10%,itisexpectedthat7%ofthetarifflineswillbeappliedtosensitivegoodsand3%willnotbeliberalised. Willemien Viljoen. 'Rules of origin, tariffs and the AfCFTA.' Tralac Blog, May 17.2019, htlps:WWW.tralac.orbIoaRrtiCIe14063-rles-of- OriQin-tariffs-and-the-afcfta.html.However,tradespecialistsarekeentoensurethatallgoodstradedamongAfricancountriesoriginatewithintheAfCFTAandnoneareimportedfromabroad,whichwouldcause4tradedeflection*. Landry Signe and Payee Madden, 'Considerations for Rules of Origin under the African Continental Free Trade Area,' Journal OfAfrican Trade. 2020, httosJdx.doi.orl0.2991iatk20l205.001.ThisisthepurposeofROOs.Inthisregard,China,asAfrica'slargestbilateraltradingpartner,isimportant.MwareyaandBhoboexplainhowtradetensionsmayariseiftherearelooseROOs-especiallyasChineseproductsareoftencheaperthanthoseproducedinAfrica. Ray Mwareya and Nyasha Bhobo, ,Will China help or hurt the AfCFTA?, The Africa Report, February 2, 2021, https:/WWW.theafrica Forexample,inthelast10years,KenyanexportsofcementwithintheEastAfricanCommunity(EAG),eg,toTanzaniaandUganda,havebeenmuchlower(4-6%)thanthoseofChina(60%).Hence,somepeopleargueforstrictROOstopreventthe4flooding,ofAfricanmarketswith,madeinChina,products.Incontrast,SigneandMaddennotethatwithstricterROOsitbecomes,moredifficultforfirmstomeetthevalue-addedthresholdandbeabletoreceivetheAfCFTAtariffpreference1.Landry Signe and Payee Madden 'Considerations for Rules of Origin.'Theauthorsrecognisethatbecauseintra-cotinentalvaluechainsarenotyetdeveloped,itwillbecostliertocomplywithROOs,impactingsmallandmedium-sizedenterprises(SMEs)andleast-developedcountries(LDCs)themost.Landry Sign6 and Payee Madden 'Considerations for Rules of Origin."Tofacilitatethedevelopmentofmoreregionalvaluechains,theUnitedNationsConferenceonTradeandDevelopment(UNCTAD)thereforesuggeststhatROO-relatedcomplicationsintheAfCFTAbeavoided;instead,ROOsshouldbe'simple,transparent,business-friendlyandpredictable*. UNCTAD, 'Rules of Origin.,Thus,underthis,business-as-usua,uncoordinatedoption,ChineseperceptionsofriskinspecificAfricancountriesandthebalanceachievedinROOswillbecriticalfordeterminingfutureinteractionswithChinaandtheBRI.Option2:AboostfortradeandeconomiccooperationzonesinAfricaDescriptionThisoptionisbestdescribedascoordinationbetweentheAfCFTAandBRIforthepurposeofincreasingandchannellingChineseFDIintocertainprioritycountriesandsectorsassociatedwithregionalandnationalIndustrialisationZmanufacturingplans.Thisoption'sapplicationdependsontwolinkedissues:thedevelopmentofindustrialisation/manufacturingplans(andtheirprominenceintheAfCFTA)andthedriversforChineseinvestorsinAfrica.Weexaminethesetwoissuesinturnbelow.TheestablishmentoftradeandeconomiczonesinAfrica-alsoreferredtoasspecialeconomiczones(SEZs)1freetradezones,exportprocessingzones,industrialzonesandfreeports,accordingtodifferentmodels-wasfirstformallymentionedinthe2006FOCACSummitinBeijingwhenthenpresidentHuJintaoannouncedthatChinahadpledged,toestablishthreetofiveoverseaseconomicandtradecooperationzonesinAfricainthenextthreeyears'. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People,s Republic