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    IMF-马尔代夫:金融部门评估方案关于宏观审慎政策的技术说明(英)-2024.1.docx

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    IMF-马尔代夫:金融部门评估方案关于宏观审慎政策的技术说明(英)-2024.1.docx

    INTERNATIONA1.MONETARYFUNDIMFCountryReportNo.24/21MA1.DIVESFINANCIA1.SECTORASSESSMENTPROGRAMJanuary2024TECHNICA1.NOTEONMACROPRUDENTIA1.PO1.ICYThispaperontheMaldiveswaspreparedbyastaffteamoftheInternationalMonetaryFundasbackgrounddocumentationfortheperiodicconsultationwiththemembercountry.ItisbasedontheinformationavailableatthetimeitwascompletedonDecember18,2023.CopiesofthisreportareavailabletothepublicfromInternationalMonetaryFundPublicationServicesPOBox92780Washington,D.C.20090Telephone:(202)623-7430Fax:(202)623-7201E-mail:publicationsimf.orgWeb:InternationalMonetaryFundWashington,D.C.©2024InternationalMonetaryFundINTERNATIONA1.MONETARYFUNDMA1.DIVESFINANCIA1.SECTORASSESSMENTPROGRAMDecember18,2023TECHNICA1.NOTEMACROPRUDENTIA1.PO1.ICYPreparedByMonetaryandCapitalMarketsDepartmentThisTechnicalNotewaspreparedbyIMFstaffinthecontextofajointIMF-WorIdBankFinancialSectorAssessmentProgram(FSAP)missionintheMaldivesduringFebruary18-March2,2023.ItcontainstechnicalanalysisanddetailedinformationunderpinningtheFSAP,sfindingsandrecommendations.FurtherinformationontheFSAPcanbefoundatCONTENTSGlossary3EXECUTIVESUMMARY4INTR0DUC110N7INSTITUTIONA1.FRAMEWORK8A. WillingnesstoAct8B. AbilitytoAct9C. EffectiveCoordinationandCooperation10D. AccountabilityandCommunication11E. Recommendations11SYSTEMICRISKMONITORING13A. ExistingIndicators13B. RecommendedAdditionalIndicators14MACROPRUDENTIA1.INSTRUMENTS18A. ExistingInstruments18B. EnvisagedInstruments19C. RecommendedAdditionalInstruments22References25BOX1. 1.easeandHirePurchaseProgramsandHouseholdIndebtedness16FIGURES2. ExistingIndicators133. Credit-to-GDPGap154. DSTI1.evelandProbabilityofDefaultofMortgage1.oansinRomania21TAB1.ES1. RecommendationsonMacroprudentialPolicy62. ModelsforMacroprudentialDecision-MakingBodies93. SuggestedEarlyWarningIndicators144. MacroprudentialInstruments:ComparisonwithPeerCountries185. Banks'InternalPrudential1.imitsforHousehold1.oans206. RecommendedMacroprudentialInstruments24GlossaryBCBSBaselCommitteeonBankingSupervisionCARCapitalAdequacyRatioCCyBCountercyclicalCapitalBufferQBCreditInformationBureauCMDACapitalMarketDevelopmentAuthorityCRECommercialRealEstateCYCurrencyD-SIBDomesticallySystemicallyImportantBankd-SRIDomesticSystemicRiskIndicatorDSTIDebtServicetoIncomeRatioFCForeignCurrencyFCAFinancialConductAuthorityFXForeignExchangeFSAPFinancialSectorAssessmentProgramHDCHousingDevelopmentCorporationHDFCHousingDevelopmentFinanceCorporationHPHodrick-PrescottHQ1.AHigh-Quality1.iquidAssets1.C1.ocalCurrency1.CR1.iquidityCoverageRatio1.TD1.oan-to-DepositRatio1.TI1.oan-to-IncomeRatio1.TV1.oan-to-ValueRatioMF1.CMaldivesFinanceand1.easingCompanyMMAMaldivesMonetaryAuthorityMoFMinistryofFinanceMoUMemorandumofUnderstandingMVRMaldivianRufiyaaNBFINon-BankFinancialInstitutionsNBSNationalBureauofStatisticsNOPNetOpenPositionNP1.Non-Performing1.oanNSFRNetStableFundingRatioPDProbabilityofDefaultRBIReserveBankofIndiaRRReserveRequirementsRWARisk-WeightedAssetsSDFCSMEDevelopmentFinanceCorporationSOEState-OwnedEnterpriseSyRBSystemicRiskBufferEXECUTIVESUMMARY】TheMaldivesMonetaryAuthority(MMA)istheentityresponsibleformaintainingfinancialstability.TheBoardofthemonetaryauthorityhasdecision-makingpowersoverMMA,sthreemandates(inorderofpriority):maintainpricestability,maintainfinancialstability,provideassistancetothegovernmentinattainingeconomicdevelopmentandstability.Tomaintainfinancialstability,MMAregulatesandsupervisesthefinancialinstitutionsandoverseesthepaymentsandsettlementssystem.ItalsohousesaCreditInformationBureau(CIB),akeyelementforbothmicroandmacroprudentialsupervision.Thesecuritiesmarket,outsideofthescopeofMMA,isregulatedbytheCapitalMarketDevelopmentAuthority(CMDA).MMAdoesnothaveamacroprudentialframework.MMA,slowcapacityandsentimentthatthefinancialsystemisisolated,simple,andlowriskhasresultedinaminimalistapproachtoitssupervision.Thereisnomacroprudentialcommitteeandnomacroprudentialmandatewithclearobjectives.ThebulkoftheworkonmacroprudentialpolicywouldneedtobedonebyafinancialstabilityunitatMMA1separatefromthe,banksandOFIdivision,zasthelatterlacksclearcorrespondingobjectivesandresourcestosafeguardfinancialstability.Inaddition,coordinationwithbothCMDAandthemainstakeholdersofthefinancialsystemappearstobelimited.Communicationtothepublicisalsosparse,withnopublicationofafinancialstabilityreport.1.ast,MMAsuffersfromasignificantlackofdatainfrastructure.DespitetheexistenceoftheCIB,dataqualityappearstobeinsufficientwithmanygaps,andaccesstothedatabaseistoolimitedinpractice.Systemicriskmonitoringisverylimitedandonlyafewmacroprudentialinstrumentsareimplemented.MMAdoesnotmonitoranyindicatorofsystemicrisk,butonlyafewmacroeconomicseriesthatarekeytothetourismsector(e.g.,touristarrivals,numberofbed-nights).Indicatorsofcreditcycle,realestate,corporateperformance,andhouseholdindebtednessarenotmonitored.Inaddition,MMAusesasinglemacroprudentialinstrument(leverageratio),althoughitiscontemplatingintroducingotherselectedtools(e.g.,1.oan-to-Value(1.TV)andDebt-Service-to-Income(DSTI)limits).Tostrengthenthewillingnessandabilitytoact,theFSAPteamrecommendsestablishingacomprehensivemacroprudentialframework.Thecreationofamacroprudentialcommitteewithaclearmandateanddecision-makingpowersisrecommended.Thiscommitteewouldrelyonawell-resourcedfinancialstabilityunit,actingasasecretariatandprovidingdata-drivenrecommendations.TheunitsmandateandlegitimacywouldbeenhancedbyprovidingalegaldefinitionOffinancialstabilitywithclearintermediateobjectives.Increasingcoordinationwiththemainstakeholdersandcommunicationtothepublicwouldstrengthentransparencyandaccountability.Tothataim,regular1ThistechnicalnotewaspreparedbyEtienneVaccaro-Grange(MCM).TheanalysisbenefitedfromdiscussionswiththestaffoftheMMAandreviewersattheIMF.meetingswiththemainactorsofthefinancialsystemshouldbeorganizedandanannualfinancialstabilityreportshouldbepublished.MMAshouldconsidercreatingasetofearlywarningindicatorsandfurtherdevelopitsmacroprudentialtoolkit.Acomprehensivedashboardofbothbroad-basedandsectoralindicatorswouldhelpmonitorsystemicrisks.Indicatorsofcredit,realestatedevelopment,corporateperformance,andhouseholdindebtednessshouldbeconsideredforimplementation.Inaddition,theintroductionofseveralkeymacroprudentialinstrumentswouldhelppreventtheemergenceofsystemicrisk.MMAshouldfollowthroughonitsplantointroducetwohousehold-relatedinstruments(limitsto1.TVandDSTIratios).TheFSAPteamrecommendsthedevelopmentofadditionalinstrumentstosafeguardbankliquidityandreducethecurrencymismatchofbanks(1.iquidityCoverageRatio(1.CR),NetStableFundingRatio(NSFR)and1.oan-to-Deposit(1.TD)inbothlocalandforeigncurrency)aswellasotherinstrumentsrecommendedbytheBaselCommitteeonBankingSupervision(e.g.zBaselI11capitalbuffers,SystemicRiskBuffer(SyRB),BaselPillar1/2capitalsurcharge).Table1summarizesthemainrecommendationswiththeassociatedtimehorizonsofimplementation.Table1.Maldives:RecommendationsonMacroprudentialPolicyRecommendationsTiming1InstitutionalFrameworkCreateaMacroprudentialCommitteehousedinMMA.(T20) Givemacroprudentialmandateanddecision-makingpowers. CoordinatewithMoFandCMDA,andotherstakeholdersasneeded.STEstablishaMacroprudentialMandate.(1121)Definefinancialstabilityinthelawwithclearmacroprudentialobjectives.STCreateafinancialstabilityunitatMMA.(1122) Directcommunicationchanneltothemacroprudentialcommittee(actassecretariat). Giveclearobjectives,includinganalysisofsystemicrisks,preparationoffinancialstabilityreport. Increasehumanresources(headcounts,budgetallocation).STPublishaFinancialStabilityReport.(H23) Backwardandforward-lookingassessmentofriskstofinancialstability. Tobepublishedinbetweenannualreportstoprovideupdateoffinancialsectordevelopments. Presenttokeystakeholders(e.g.,MoFandtheParliament).MTImprovedatainfrastructure.(1124) GrantaccesstoCIBtorelevantMMAdivisions(banksandOFIdivision,futurefinancialstabilityunit). AddressvariousdatagapsatCIB. BuildadatabaseofcorporatefinancialdatathroughMMAon-siteinspections. Constructapropertypriceindex,leveragingexistinginformation(e.g.,atHDFC).ISystemicRiskMonitoringDevelopsystemicriskindicators.(I26-H33)Developindicatorsformeasurementandmonitoringofsystemicrisk.MTMacroprudentlalInstrumentsCalibratecontemplatedandothermacroprudentialinstruments.(I35-1I39)Introduceregulatorylimitsto1.TV,1.T1.1.CR,NSFR,1.TDratios.MTDevelopotherinstrumentsrecommendedbytheBCBS.(H40-U45)IntroduceBaselIIIcapitalbuffers.MT11:Immediately;ST:Shortterm(lessthan1year);MT:MediumTerm(1-5years)INTRODUCTION1. TheassessmentofmacroprudentialpolicywasconductedduringthefirstmissionoftheFSAPinFebruary-March2023.FollowingaWorldBankDevelopmentModulein2016,thisisthefirstjointIMF-WorIdBankFSAPwiththeMaldives.ThisTechnicalNoteprovidesaroadmapforestablishingaframeworkformacroprudentialpolicyaswellasdevelopingsystemicriskindicatorsandmacroprudentialpolicytools.2. TheCOVID-19pandemichastakenaseveretollontheMaldives'tourism-dependenteconomy.Tourismactivitycollapsedascontainmentmeasures,notablytemporaryborderclosures,wereputinplacetocontainthespreadofthevirus.Asaresult,realGDPcontractedbyanunprecedented32.9percentin2020.Althoughtheeconomyreboundedwitha37.7percentincreaseineconomicactivityin2021,astouristinfluxresumed,thepandemichasexacerbatedpre-existingvulnerabilities.ApersistentlyhighfiscaldeficitandawideningcurrentaccountdeficitcoupledwithrisinggovernmentdebtandadepletionofinternationalreserveshaveputtheMaldivesinadifficultpositiondespitenear-recordlevelsoftouristarrivalsinrecentmonths.3. TheFSAPteamidentifiedseveralmacro-financialsourcesofsystemicrisk.PersistentFXshortages,astrongsovereign-banknexus,andhighloanconcentrationposethreatstofinancialstability.Inaddition,MMA,slowcapacityandsentimentthatthefinancialsystemisisolated,simple,andlowriskhasresultedinaminimalistapproachtoitssupervision.Forinstance,MMAhasnomacroprudentialframework,nodashboardofearlywarningindicatorsofsystemicrisk,andonlyasinglemacroprudentialinstrument.4. Despiterecordlevelsoftouristarrivals,thereisapersistentshortageofFXinthebankingsystem.Duetohighcurrentaccountdeficitsstemmingfromlarge-scaleinfrastructureprojectsandrisingSOEandcentralgovernmentexternaldebtservice,DebtserviceinpercentofdomesticGNFSexportsgrewfrom7.5percentin2018,to12.9percentin2019,and37.4percentin2020,beforedecliningthereafter.ExternalPPGdebtgrewfrom40.3percentin2019to74.9percentin2020,beforereversingthetrendinthefollowingyears.MMA,sgrossinternationalreservesdeclinedfromUSD985millionin2020toUSD806millionin2021beforereboundingtoUSD832millionin2022.TheseexternalimbalanceshaveledtoinsufficientFXsupplyfromMMAtobanksandapersistentparallelmarketwithapremiumofabout15percent.Asaresult,theremaybeunmetcreditdemandinFXintheeconomyandnaturallyhedgedFXborrowersmayencounterliquidityshocksifthereisastopintourismandFXinflows.Goingforward,highlevelsofexternaldebtservicefromthepublicsector,alongwithtighterglobalfinancialconditions,mayputadditionalstrainontheexchangeratepegandcouldleadtoadevaluationifthecountryalsoweretoexperienceasevereeconomicshock.5. Astrongsovereign-banknexusposesriskstothebankingsector.Theshareofbanks,holdingsofgovernmentdebtamountedto135percentofregulatorycapitalatend-2022,aidedbyzeroriskweightsandnoregulatorylimitsonsuchholdings.Inaddition,somelargeSOEshaveunsustainablefinancialpositions(e.g.,HDC),whichincreasestheneedforgovernmentsupportandthecontingentliabilities.Iffiscalspaceweretotightenfurther,thegovernmentmaynolongerbeabletoprovidesupporttotheSOEs.Thismayeventuallyspillovertothefinancialsector.6. Ahighloanconcentrationexposesbankstoasignificantcreditrisk.Onebankisclosetothesupervisorysinglelargeexposurelimitasthecorporatesectorischaracterizedbyafewlargefirms.Duetoweaknessesinthedataqualityandcoverageofthecreditinformationbureau(CIB),totalhouseholddebt(service)isunderestimated.Inparticular,theexclusionofnon-regulatedIease-and-hirefpurchasefirmsisanimportantdatagapthatpreventsapropermonitoringofhouseholdindebtedness.7. MMAdoesnothaveamacroprudentialframework.MMAhasaminimalistapproachtoitsmacroprudentialpolicy.Thereisnoinstitutionalframeworkinplace(nomacroprudentialmandate,nocoordinationcommitteetodiscussfinancialstabilityissues).MMAhasnodefinitionofsystemicrisk,doesnotconductanyregularanalysisoffinancialstability,anddoesnotpublishanyfinancialstabilityreport.Ithasnorelevantdataatitsdisposal,apartforafewmacroeconomicseriesthatarekeytothetourismsector(e.g.,touristarrivals,numberofbed-nights).Inaddition,onlyasinglemacroprudentialinstrumentisinplace(aleverageratio),althoughMMAhasbeencontemplatingintroducingselectedtools(e.g.,1.TV,DSTIlimits,liquidityinstruments).8. Againstthisbackdrop,theFSAPteamsrecommendstheintroductionofamacroprudentialframeworktohelpMMAmaintainfinancialstability.Acomprehensivemacroprudentialframework,including:(i)stronginstitutionalarrangementstoensurethewillingnessandabilitytoactofthemacroprudentialauthority,(ii)thedevelopmentofbroad-basedandsectoralearlywarningindicators,and(iii)theuseofrelevantmacroprudentialinstruments,constitutethebasisforasoundmacroprudentialpolicyworkingtowardsmaintainingfinancialstability.INSTITUTIONA1.FRAMEWORKA.WillingnesstoAct9. Astronginstitutionalframeworkisessentialtoensurethatmacroprudentialpolicycanworkeffectively.Theframeworkneedstoassurewillingnesstoactandcounterbiasesforinactionorinsufficientlytimelyactionthatcanarisefromdifficultiesinquantifyingthebenefitsofmacroprudentialaction.Aclearmandatecancounterthesebiasesandunderpinthelegitimacyofpolicyactionwhensurveillancepointstoelevatedsystemicrisks.Equallyimportant,theframeworkneedstofostertheabilitytoactinthefaceofevolvingsystemicthreats,byassuringaccesstoinformationandaneffectivesurveillancecapacity,andbyassigninganappropriaterangeandreachofmacroprudentialinstrumentstothemacroprudentialauthority.Itneedsfinallytopromoteeffectivecooperationinriskassessmentsandmitigation,inamannerthatpreservestheautonomyofseparatepolicyfunctions.ThissectionevaluatesthecurrentinstitutionalarrangementsintheMaldivesagainstthesethreekeyprinciples,whicharesetoutintheIMFStaffGUidanCeNoteOnMaCrOPnJdentialPoliCy(IMF2014a).10. MMAisthedesignatedauthorityinchargeoffinancialstabilityintheMaldives.Althoughitdoesnothaveapropermacroprudentialmandateorframework,MMAistheentityinchargeof"maintainingfinancialstabilitywithoutprejudicetomaintainingpricestabilityconducivetotheSustainabIegrowthoftheeconomy",asperitsmandate(MMAAct,2020amendmentsection4).MMAisresponsibleforregulatingandsupervisingthefinancialsectorotherthanthesecuritiesmarket,whichisregulatedbyCMDA.MMAalsoregulatesthepaymentsystemandhousestheCIB,bothofwhichareanimportantpartofthefinancialmarketinfrastructure.11. MMAdoesnothavealegaldefinitionoffinancialstabilitybutonlyanoperationalone.MMAstatesonitsweb

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