全球发展中心-国际货币基金组织的韧性和可持续性信托：条件如何帮助各国建立韧性（英）-2024.3.docx

CGDCMTFPFOBG1.OBA1.DEVE1.OPMENTTheIMrSResilienceandSustainabilityTrust:HowConditionalityCanHelpCountriesBuildResilienceJOHNHICK1.INAbstractTheIMF'sResilienceandSustainabilityTrust(RST)hasbeenoperationalforoverayear,withthefirstseventeencountriesreceivingcommitmentsOffinancialsupport.ButiflendingfromtheRSTistoachieveitsobjectives,theIMFshouldmakeitfitterforpurposebytakingaradicallydifferentapproachinapplyingconditionstotheloans.Thispaperfirstgivesthebackgroundandsummarizestheargument;setsouttheuniquechallengesinvolvedindesigningbestpracticeconditionalitytodealwithclimatechange-thefocusoftheRSTsofar;andmakesthreespecificsuggestionstoaddressshortcomingsintheemergingconditionalitytomakethemostoftheIMF'snewinitiativetohelpmembercountriesbuildresilienceandsustainability.TheIMFhasadapteditsapproachbasedoninitialexperience.AforthcomingExecutiveBoardreviewwillallowforfurthercoursecorrectionandmuch-neededgreatertractionfortheRST.PO1.ICYPAPER324MARCH2024TheIMF,sResilienceandSustainabilityTrust:HowConditionalityCanHelpCountriesBuildResilienceJohnHicklinCenterforGlobalDevelopmentTheauthorisgratefulforhelpfulconversationswithDavidAndrews,SanjeevGupta,KathrynMCPhai1.MarkPlant,andEtienneRomsom,andforcommentsfromtwoanonymousreviewers;andisresponsibleforanyremainingerrors.JohnHicklin.2024.wThelMF,sResilienceandSustainabilityTrust:HowConditionalityCanHelpCountriesBuildResilience.*CGDPolicyPaper324.Washington,DC:CenterforGlobalDevelopmenthttps：/www.cgdev.orgpublication/imfs-rst-how-conditionality-can-help-countries-build-resilienceCENTERFORG1.OBA1.DEVE1.OPMENTTheCenterforGlobalDevelopmentworkstoreduceglobal20551.Street,NWFifthFloorWashington,DC200361AbbeyGardensGreatCollegeStreet1.ondonSW1P3SEpovertyandimprovelivesthroughinnovativeeconomicresearchthatdrivesbetterpolicyandpracticebytheworld'stopdecisionmakers.UseanddisseminationofthisPolicyPaperisencouraged;however,reproducedcopiesmaynotbeusedforcommercialpurposes.FurtherusageispermittedunderthetermsoftheCreativeCommonsAttribution-NonCommerciaI4.0International1.icense.www.cgdev.orgCenterforGlobalDevelopment.2024.TheviewsexpressedinCGDPolicyPapersarethoseoftheauthorsandshouldnotbeattributedtotheboardofdirectors,fundersoftheCenterforGlobalDevelopment,ortheauthors'respectiveorganizations.ContentsA. Backgroundandsummaryofargument1B. Theexceptionalpolicychallengesposedbyclimatechange7Theurgencytoaddresstheexceptionalrisksofclimatechange8Theexceptionalsizeofthefinancingrequirements10Thecomplexityofthedomesticpolicychallenge11Theweaknessofdomesticaccountabilityforclimatechangepolicies12Thefailuresintheglobalsystemofaccountability13C. AmoreambitiousapproachtoRSFconditionality14Bestpracticeconditionality15MainfeaturesofRSFconditionalitysofar16AddressingtheshortcomingsofRSFconditionality17Issue1.MaximizingRSFeffectivenessthroughgreatertransparencyandaccountability17Proposal1.Establishanewmechanismfortransparencyandaccountability18Issue2.IncreasingRSFeffectivenessbyfocusonafew“IMF-focused”criticalactions21Proposal2.Focusmoreclearlyonafewcriticalactions22Issue3.IncreasingtheurgencyofRSFengagementwithasmanycountriesaspossible24Proposal3.Introducealow-accesscredittranchetotheRSF25TheparallelneedforamajorinitiativetostrengthenArticleIVsurveillanceforallmembers26References.271.istofBoxes1. Theescalatingrisksandcostsofclimatechange82. Accountabilitygapsintheframeworkofinternationalcooperation13A. BackgroundandsummaryofargumentTheIMFformallyestablisheditsnewResilienceandSustainabilityTrust(RST)inApril2022withitsdeclaredpurpose,tohelpcountriesbuildresiliencetoexternalshocksandensuresustainablegrowth,contributingtotheirlong-termbalanceofpaymentsstability.SeeIMFstatementandpolicypaper(IMF,April18,2022)andAndrews,PlantandHickJIn,"TheIMF'sRSTHaSMetContributors'Wishes-NowItMustMeetBorrowers'Needs!"(CGDblog.May10,2022).AnOperationalGuidanceNotewasissuedinNovember2023(IMF,November28,2023).ThefocushassofarbeenexclusivelytoaddressthechallengeOfclimatechangethoughpandemicpreparednesswasidentifiedasanotherareatobecovered,withthepossibilityofaddingothertopicsatalaterstage.Inall,143countriesweredeemedeligibleinprinciple.TheimmediateimpetusfortheIMF,sinitiativecameinthemidstoftheglobalpandemic.TheunprecedentedallocationinAugust2021ofsome$650billionworthofSpecialDrawingRights(SDRs)toIMFmembercountrieswasaccompaniedbyapledgefromthelargesteconomies-whohadnoneedofthelion,ssharetheyreceivedoftheadditionalSDRs-to"recycle"or'*re-channe,$100billionworthofSDRstocountriesingreaterneedofthem.SeeG20Rome1.eaders'Declaration(G20,2021).PartwasenvisagedtobolstertheIMF,sPovertyReductionandGrowthFacility(PRGT)withsomescopealsotochannelthroughothermultilateralinstitutions.Some$44billionwastargetedforthenewRST,ofwhichsome$36billioncouldbelentoutwiththeremaindersetasidetoprovideagainstliquidityandcreditrisk.Bytheend-December2023,theRSThadsecuredtotalpledgesofSDR31.9billion($42.8billion),ofwhichSDR26.3billion($35.3billion)countstowardtheSDR33billionRSTfundraisingtarget($44billionattheprevailingexchangerate).Seeforg,enTopicsResilience-and-Sustainabllity-Trust;andalsohttps:/data.one.org/data-dives/sdr/Htracking-sdrchanneling-through-the-rstWithamountssetasidefordepositandreserveaccounts,thefundraisingtargetwouldallowsomeSDR27billion($36billion)tobeavailableforloans.Sofar,almost$30billionisavailabletolend.TheResilienceandSustainabilityFacility(RSF)wascreatedasthe加ndinginstrumentfundedbytheRST.1.endingoperationsbeganinlate2022.ByOctober2022theIMFhadfirmedupsufficientnancialcontributionsfromcreditorsanddeclaredthenewTrustoperational.SeestatementbytheManagingDirector(IMF,October12,2022).Subsequentlyitnegotiatedpolicyprogramswiththefirstrecipients,settingtheconditionsthatcountriesmustmeettosecureloanswithunusuallylong-term(20-year)maturity.Byend-February2024,theIMFExecutiveBoardhadapprovedcommitmentstotaling$7.0billiontoCostaRiCa,Barbados,Rwanda,Bangladesh,Jamaica,Kosovo,Seychelles,Senegal,Niger,Kenya,Morocco,Moldova,CaboVerde,Benin,Mauritania,Paraguay,andCameroon.ThefirstdisbursementswerenotscheduledtobemadeforseveralmonthsafterinitialapprovalanddependedonsubsequentIMFExecutiveBoardreview.Byend-February2024,only$1.4billionhadbeendisbursedtoninecountries,withafurther$3.4billiontotheseventeencountriessofarscheduledfor2024.Firstdisbursementsscheduledfor2023wereapprovedforRwandainMay;BarbadosandCostaRicainJune;JamaicainAugust；KosovoinOctober；Seychelles,Bangladesh,andSenega)inDecember；andforKenyaInJanuary2024.Niger's2023disbursementawaitsapproval.Forupdatedtracking,seehttps:/data.one.org/data-dives/sdrntracking-sdr-channeling-through-the-rst.Nonetheless,gettingeventhisfarisanaccomplishmentandreflectstheIMF'sabilitytoadaptitsfinancinginstrumentstomeetnewneedsofitsmembercountries.TheIMFhashadtoovercomemajortechnical,legal,andfinancialhurdlesaswellasfindpolicyconsensusamongstshareholders.However,whatcomesnext-includingtheapproachtoconditionality-willbecrucialtodeterminingwhetherthisinitiativeisultimatelyasuccess.Acentralissueisthatthemetricsforsuccessarenotwellspecified,makingitdifficultfortheRSTtobefullyeffectiveuntiltheyaremadeclearandconditionsappropriatelygearedtowhattheIMFcanhelpdeliver.TheIMF,sapproachsofarseemstobetohopeforthebestbyprovidingadditionalliquiditysupportandbyspecifyingasconditionsvarioususefulcountry-ledpolicyreforms-somealreadyunderconsideration-thatplausiblycontributetotacklinglong-termstructuralproblemsandprospectivebalance-of-paymentsproblems.Thisapproachblursthreecompetingthoughnotexplicitobjectives.Themostimportantistosupportsubstantivepolicyreformincountriesfacingclimatechange.Twoothersareimplicit:todisbursequicklytoalleviateliquidityconcerns;andtocontribute-defacto-todebtreprofilingfordevelopingcountriesintheyearstocome,objectivesthatareeasiertopursueatthemarginthroughtheRSFthanrelyingsolelyonregularIMFfacilities.However,specifyingmoreclearlytheIMF,sroleinthedifficulttaskofmeetingthefirstobjectiveisthekeytotheultimatesuccessoftheRST,andthefocusofthispaper.Forsome,aquickdisbursementofRSFfundswouldmarkonemeasureofsuccess.Bycontrast,noothermultilateralinstitutionhasyetmanagedtodeviseandimplementaschemewithsufficientshareholdersupporttorecycleSDRsatall,thoughtheAfricanDevelopmentBank(AfDB)isfurthestadvanced.SeePlant,"FundingHybridCapitalattheAfDBIstheBestDealforSDRDonors."(CGDblog.March9,2023).FurtherimpetuswasgivenduringtheIMFsAnnualMeetingsinOctober2023.AmetricofrapiddisbursementwouldbeunsurprisinggiventhecircumstancesunderwhichtheRSTwascreated.ManydevelopingcountriesfacedliquidityconstraintsandlackoffiscalspaceduringtheCOVID-19pandemic,inadditiontothedauntingfinancingrequirementsamountingtoseveraltrillionsofdollarseachyeartorestructuretheireconomiestoinvestinenergytransitionwhiletacklingclimatechangeandpreparingforfuturepandemics.Eachofthesechallengesentailspresentorprospectivebalanceofpaymentsproblems,andtheRSFfundscanbeveryusefuladditionalresourcesforindividualcountries.Nonetheless,theamountspledgedtotheRSFareextremelymodestcomparedtothescaleofthefinancingneeds,muchofwhichwillcomefromtheprivatesectoraswellasotherofficialsources,bothexternalanddomestic.AkeyroleforrapiddisbursementofRSFfunds,givingfinancialsupporttonationalpolicyintent,isthereforethesignalitsendsthatcancatalyzemuchlargerresourcesfromothersources.Besidesadesiretodisbursequickly,thedesignofRSFconditionalitysuggestsanadditionalifunstatedpurposetohelpreprofileacountryzsdebtserviceobligations.RSFdisbursementsfinancesomenewupfrontbudgetexpenditurebutalsoprovideareservebuffer,sothattheRSFtopsupaccesstotheresourcesthatareprovidedbytherequiredregularIMFprogram.TheIMF'sapproachthereforehastheeffectofmakingiteasierforcountriestoservicedebtthatwillbeduetotheIMFandothersinthenextfewyearswhenmanyRSF-eligiblecountriesfacetheprospectofdebtdistressthatisheightenedbywar,pandemic,andclimatechange,inadditiontoanypolicyshortcomings.Sincethe20-yearmaturityofRSFloansexceedsthatforregularIMFandPRGTloans,theRSFwouldinessenceallowapartialreschedulingofdebtservicefallingduetotheIMFandothers.Thetemptationtopursuethisunstatedbenefitshouldnot,however,distractfromtryingtomaximizetheRSF,simpactonincreasinglong-termresiliencetoclimatechange(andtootherchallengesincludingpandemics).Fundamentally,thesuccessoftheRSFwilldependonthestrengthofthepoliciesthatcountriesundertaketobolstertheirresilience,andtheRSFcontributioncomesfromthelinkbetweentheavailabilityofIMFfinancingandthenatureandspeedofpolicyactionthattheRSFloanswillhelptosupport.ThedesignofRSFprogramconditionswillthereforebekeytowhetherthenewTrustsucceedsinitspurpose.ArgumentsovertheappropriatedesignofRSFconditionalityarejustthelatestepisodeinalongsagaofcontroversiesoverIMFconditionalitypolicy,andoffrequentreviewsofitbytheIMFitselfThemostrecentwascompletedin2019,see*,2018ReviewofProgramDesignandCOnditiOnaIiy(IMFMay2019).AparticularlyeventfulandcontentiousperiodisdescribedinJamesBoughton,"SilentRevolution:TheInternationalMonetaryFund1979-1989"(IMF,2001),pp557-636.InthecaseoftheRSF,thedebateoverwhetherconditions-includingthe195ReformMeasures(RMS)inthefirstseventeenprograms-arenecessaryorsufficient,ortoolenientortooburdensome,isheightenedbytheoriginalframingofthedesiretorecycleSDRstothosemostvulnerableasawaytomakethe2021SDRallocationmoreequitable.Thepressuretodisbursemoneyquicklymightsuggestverylightconditionality,andthereiscertainlynoshortageofpolicyactionsrelatedtobuildingacountry,sresiliencethatcouldplausiblybeusedtojustifyquickdisbursementsifdesired.Moreover,someofthe143eligibleborrowingcountrieswillbeputoffiftheyperceivetherequirementsimposedbycreditorstobetoostringent,includingtohaveaparallel“regular“IMFprogramorcreditline,giventhestigmathatanyagreementwiththeIMFevokes.Othercountrieswillstruggletogarnerthepoliticalwilltotakesubstantivepolicymeasuresonclimatemitigationoradaptationthatrequirethetime,skill,andsupporttobuildconsensusfordifficultdecisions.CreditorsareconcernedlesttooeasyRSFconditionalitywouldencouragecountriestobypassconditionalityusuallyrequiredunderregularIMFprograms,andbydoingsowouldweakentheprospectsofrepayingRSFloans.Applyingparallelandthereforetougherconditionalityhasbeenonewaythatcreditorsarguewillpreservethemreserveassetstatus“oftheon-lentSDRs.BasedontheagreedRSFmodalitiesandtheevidencefromearlycases,theaimsofrelativelyrapidfinancingandfacilitatingsubstantivechangewillbefurthered,butmodestly:therateofactualdisbursementsisslowzandtheimpactonresiliencedifficulttoquantify.ThemodalitiesoftheRSF,includingthephasednatureofdisbursementsandloanconditions,especiallytherequirementtohaveaconcurrentIMFprogramorcreditline,metthecreditors*requirementsandasaresulteventhecommittedSDRswillnotbedisbursedveryquickly.ForthefirstRSF-supportedreformprograms,thefirsttranchewasnotmadeavailableforsomefourmonths(CostaRica)toninemonths(Bangladesh)afterExecutiveBoardapproval,withfulldisbursementspreadoutoverthreeyears,andcontingentonperformancenotonlyofagreedreformmeasuresundertheRSFbutalsooftheaccompanyingmacroeconomicprogram.Withthepresentlimitsonacountry,saccesstoRSFfunds,theapproximately$30billionnowavailablewouldbedisbursedby2030onlyiftheearlypaceofapprovalsismaintainedandifallprogramsarefullyimplemented.1.imitsonindividualcountryaccessweresetinitiallyatthelesserofSDR1billionorISOpercentofIMFquota,witha"norm"of75percent.Theaverageaccessforthefirstseventeenprogramswas$0.4billion(onaverage,112percentofquota),withtwoeconomies(BangladeshandMorocco)cappedatSDR1billion($1.3billion)andsevenothersatthemaximum150percentofquota.Asimilaraverageprofilewouldrequiremorethan50additionalprogramstobeapprovedby2027todisburse$30billionby2030.Forcritiques,seeGuptaandBrown,*,HowCantheIMF'sNew1.endingFacilityforClimateandPandemicPreparednessBeMadeMoreEfFective?*(CGDblog,March29,2023);GUPtaandBrown,"IMF1.endingUndertheResilienceandSustainabilityTrust：AnInitialAssessmen1."(CGDpolicypaper289,March28,2023；andGuptaandBrown,"TheResilienceandSustainabilityFacility'sRecentProgramsStillFallShortofItsAmbitiousGoals."(CGDblog,August22.2023),whofocusonthe"low-depth"ofreformmeasuressofar.SeealsoCitrinandSembene,"IMFSupportforClimateResilienceinAfricaIsHelpful,ButMoreCanBeDone."(CGDblog,September22,2023)whoargueforgreateraccesstofinancing.Moreover,theearlycaseshavefocusedonlyonclimatechangeresilience,notyetonpandemicpreparednessthatwastheotherIssuehighlightedintheExecutiveBoarddecisionestablishingtheRSTinApril2022.Thedegreeofsubstantivechangeisinquestion,andthedangerwiththecurrentapproachisthattheIMFwilloverpromiseandunderachieveinitsbidtobolstercountries*long-termresilienceandsustainablegrowth.Theinitialcountryprogramsreflectanenormousamountoftechnicalworkandcommitmentatthenationallevel,andsignificantcooperationbetweentheIMFstaffandpartnerinstitutions,includingtheWorldBank.However,therearethreeconcernsabouttheeffectivenessofRSFconditionality.First,sinceagreementnowonReformMeasuresisonlypartofthegeneration-longprocessOfbuildingconsensusandadaptingpoliciessufficienttomeetanever-changingconcepto