牛津经济研究院-去全球化神话：亚洲供应链如何变化（英）-2024.docx

Hinrich-IMDSUSTAINAB1.ETRADEINDEX2023DEEPDIVEhinrichfoundationNdVanUlngcuctainabglobaltradTheDeglobalizationMyth:HowAsia'ssupplychainsarechangingBYTHANGNGUYEN-QUOCOXFORDECONOMICSaOXFORD<ECONOMICSContentsEXECUTIVESUMMARY3INTRODUCTION5METHODO1.OGY6G1.OBA1.SUPP1.YCHAINSCONTINUETHEIREXPANSIONZlGlobalIGtradehasrisendespiteadifficultperiod7UNear-shoringhasnotmaterializedatthegloballevel8ASIA,SSUPP1.YCHAINSAREUNDERGOINGMAJORCHANGES3.1Chinaisdecoupling-butonlyfromtheUSandJapan1132Newsupplychain“hotspots“areemerginginAsia13MU1.TIP1.EPATHWAYSTOSUPP1.YCHAINRESI1.IENCE16CONC1.USION19ABBREVIATIONS20ENDNOTES21ABOUTOXFORDECONOMICS22ExecutivesummaryGlobalsupplychainshavecontinuedtoexpand,despitetalkofdeglobalizationandnearshoring.Regionalsourcinghasfallenacrossmostmajorworldregions,suggestingnearshoringmaynotyetbeaprevalentstrategy.Sincetheearly2010szrisinglaborcostsinChinahavecausedmanyenterprisestoexplorealternativemanufacturingbasesandsourcingstrategiestomaintaintheircompetitiveness.MorerecentdisruptionssuchastheUS-Chinatradewar,Covid-19pandemic,andsanctionsonRussiahavefurtherpromptedbusinessestore-evaluatetheresilienceoftheirsupplychains.NotonlydotheydriveupthecostOftradingduetohighertariffsandsanctions,theyalsoaddedpolicyuncertaintiesthathinderthesmoothandefficientoperationofglobalproductionnetworks.Thesedevelopmentshaveledtovariousclaimsaboutthedemiseofglobalization,theriseofnear-shoring,andthedecouplingofChinafromthesupplychainsofWesterncompanies.Thisreportpresentsanup-to-dateoverviewofglobalandAsiansupplychainsandassessesthesedifferentclaimsbyfocusingondataforbilateralcross-bordertradeofIntermediateGoods(IG)zagranularclassofproductsthatmoreaccuratelyrepresentssupplychaincomponentrythanthefinalgoodsusedinmostotheranalyses.Despitetalkofdeglobalizationandnearshoring,thisstudyfindsthatglobalsupplychainshavecontinuedtoexpand.Wefindthatglobalsupplychainshavecontinuedtoexpand,despitetalkofdeglobalizationandnearshoring.Intra-regionalsourcing,measuredbytheshareofIGimportsoriginatingfromcountrieswithinthesameregion,hasfallenacrossmostmajorworldregions,suggestingnearshoringmaynotyetbeaprevalentstrategyatthegloballevel.TradedecouplingremainslargelyaUS-Chinaphenomenon.China,sshareofIGimportsintotheUSdroppingfrom18.5%in2018to14.1%in2022.Ontheotherhand,wefindevidencethatdecouplinghasmaterializedforChina'stradewiththeUSandJapan-ChinazsshareofIGimportsintotheUSfellfrom18.5%in2018to14.1%in2022.Thissharedroppedto11.4%inthefirsthalfof2023.Incontrast,ChinahasgainedimportanceasasourceofinputsshippedtoseveralGroupofSeven(G7)developedeconomies.Forexample,between2018and2022,China,sshareoftotalIGimportsincreasedfrom11.1%to15.9%inGermany,andfrom10.3%to15.1%intheUnitedKingdom.WhileChinaremainsthecenterofFactoryAsia,theAsia-Pacific'sIGtradehasbeendiversifying.AfewAsianeconomiesareemergingas“hotspots“ofIGtradegrowthinthisvolatileandincreasinglytensegeopoliticalglobalenvironment.Inparticular,VietnamandIndonesiaregistereddouble-digitgrowthinannualIGexportsduringthisperiod.High-levelcomparativeanalysisofthese“hotspot“economiesrevealsmarkedlydifferenteconomicstructuresandgeopoliticalorientations.Forexample,VietnamhasmadestridesinbecomingmoreimportantforinternationalsourcingforboththeUSandChina.ThisreflectsnotonlytheneedsofWesternmultinationalsbutalsoChineseenterpriseslookingtoexpandproductionbaseabroad.FDIinflowsfromChinatoVietnamhavesurgedin2023andarenowthelargestofanycountrytoVietnam.Incontrast,IndiahasbecomemoreimportantforUSsupplychains,butlessimportantforChina,ssupplychains.Despiteescalatinggeopoliticaltensions,ChinahasbecomeincreasinglyreliantonTaiwanforitsinputs.Taiwan'sshareinChina'sIGimportsincreasedfrom12.2%to14%between2018and2022,partlydrivenbyhigherdemandforadvancedsemiconductorproductsduringthepandemicthatdroveuppricesfortheseproducts.Taiwanproducesmorethan60%oftheworld'ssemiconductorsandmorethan90%ofthemostadvancedones.ThediversityofeconomicstructuresandUS-Chinaorientationsacrossthese“hotspot“economiessuggeststhatthereismorethanonewinningstrategytonavigatethechanginglandscapeofglobalsupplychains.IntroductionCompaniesareseekingtoreduceriskintheirsupplychainconfigurationbydiversifyingtheirsupplierbases,establishingmoreefficientsupplychainfootprints,exploringalternativeproductionhubstoenhancesupplychainvisibilityandagility.Theshiftingdynamicsofsupplychains,especiallyinAsia,areanimportantandtopicalissuefortheglobaleconomy.Companysourcingstrategieshavefar-reachingimplications,impactingnotonlytheefficiencyofbusinessesbutalsoinfluencingtradedynamics,economicgrowth,andcompetitivenesstrendsonaglobalscale.Duringthe1990s,whentheprocessOfglobalizationacceleratedandproductionprocessesbecameincreasinglyfragmentedacrosscountries,China'sriseasthezFactoryoftheWorldzwassupportedbyitscheapandplentifulsupplyoflabor.Aswageshaveincreasedinrecentyears,however,Chinesefirmshaveincreasinglyfocusedonhighervalue-addedactivitiesthroughacombinationofupgradedfactories,technologyadoption,andworkforceskillenhancements.Inturn,supplychainsinAsiaadaptedtotheseshiftingdynamics,withmanymultinationalsexploringalternativesourcingapproaches-forexample,theso-called“ChinaPlusOnewstrategy,wherebycompaniesdiversifiedoperationsbyexpandingoutsideofChinawhilestillmaintainingapresenceinthecountry.MorerecentdisruptionssuchastheUS-Chinatradewar,theCOVID-19pandemic,andRussiansanctionshavefurtherpromptedbusinessestore-evaluatetheresilienceoftheirsupplychains.Inadditiontotherisingcostoftradeduetohighertariffsandsanctions,thesetensionsalsocreatepolicyuncertaintiesforbusinesses-whicharedetrimentaltothesmoothandefficientoperationofglobalproductionnetworks.Companiesareseekingtoreduceriskintheirsupplychainconfigurationbydiversifyingtheirsupplierbases,establishingmoreefficientsupplychainfootprints,exploringalternativeproductionhubstosupportchangingdemandpatterns,andembracingdigitaltechnologiestoenhancesupplychainvisibilityandagility.Inthiscontext,ourstudyseekstoprovidenewinsightsintotheevolutionofsupplychainsinAsiaandgloballyoverthe2018-22period,andthefirsthalfof2023whereapplicable.Specifically,itexaminesofficialbilateraltradedataforIGtotracecross-borderflowsofrawmaterialsandintermediateinputs.Collectedbyofficialcustomsagencies,dataonIGtradeoffersup-to-date,comprehensive,andinternationallycomparablestatisticstoanalyzeglobalproductionnetworks.Box1furtherdescribesthemethodologyusedforthisanalysis.TheanalysisprovidesacomplementaryanddeeperdiveintothecriticaldimensionsoftheHinrich-IMDSustainableTradeIndex(STI).Firstzithighlightstheevolutionoftradeconcentration;inthisregard,itextendsourrecentworkfortheHinrichFoundationonthediversificationofglobaltradebyanalyzingshiftsinthecountryoforiginforinputswithinthesupplychainbeyondChinaandassessingrecentclaimsregardingnear-shoringtrends.1Second,weidentifyanumberoftradegrowth'hotspot'countriesinAsiaandfindthattheytendtocombineanumberofdifferentsuccessfactorsidentifiedbytheindex,suchasFDIattractivenessandtechnologicalcapabilities.Thediversityofthesecountriesunderlinestheneedtoadoptamulti-dimensionalframeworktoassessingtraderegimesacrosscountries,inlinewiththefindingsoftheSTI.MethodologyIGisdefinedasinputsusedtoproduceafinalproduct,excludingprimaryfuelsandlubricants.Theyrangefromcropsusedinfoodproductiontotextiles,metals,andcomputerchipsneededtomanufacturegoods.InternationaltradeintheseproductsisidentifiedandaggregatedbyofficialcustomsagenciesaccordingtotheUnitedNations'BroadEconomicClassification(BEC)zversion4.FocusingontradeinIGoffersanumberofadvantagesoverothermethodologiesinstudyingglobalsupplychains.Inparticular,manyeconomicstudiesofsupplychainsoftenfocusonasinglesectororcountry,thusoccludingacomprehensiveviewofglobalsupplychains.Whilesomestudieshavemadeuseofglobalinputoutputtablestopresentamorecomprehensiveeconomy-wideview,theseanalysesarebasedonoutdatedinformation.Forexample,atthetimeofwritingthisreport(autumn2023)ztheOrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment(OECD)TradeinValueAddeddatabaseonlycontainsinformationupto2018.AlthoughdataonForeignDirectInvestmentsmaybemorefrequentlyupdated,theyoftenlackthebilateraldimensionoftheseflowsthatwouldenableananalysisoftheevolutionofproductionnetworks.Incontrasttothesedatasources,customsdata(especiallyimports)offermorerecentandcomprehensivecoverageofformalcross-bordertrade,whichismoresuitedtoourresearchprioritiesforthisreport.Importdatatypicallyhasbetterqualitythanexportdataduetotheprevalenceofdutiesandtaxesonimports,whichnecessitatecustomsdeclarationsandtheformalrecordingoftheseflows.Withthisinmind,importdatawascollectedfrom91nationalcustomsagencies(coveringmorethan70%oftotalIGtradein2018-21).Exportflowswerethenanalyzedasthemirroroftheseimportflows.ThedatawassourcedfromtheUnitedNationsCommodityTradeStatisticsDatabase(UNCOMTRADE)andaccessedthroughtheWorldIntegratedTradeSolutions(WITS)portal.TounderstandthecompositionofIGimportsintotheUSuntilthefirsthalfof2023,wesourcedmonthlyUSimportdatafromUNCOMTRADE.WethenusedtheBECclassificationstoidentifyandselectonlytradeinIG.Weappliedfurthercleaningandtreatmentofthedataasnecessary,suchasaggregatingHongKongSARandMacautradeflowsintoChina.Taiwanwasidentifiedas"OtherAsia,notelsewherespecified,*(code490)inUNCOMTRADE.FortheanalysisofspecifictopicssuchasUS-Chinadecoupling,wealsousedexportdatafromG7countriesandChinafromUNCOMTRADEtogainacomprehensiveviewoftheexportpatternsbythesekeycountries.BasedonthisdataforIGtrade,wefirstdevelopedstatisticalindicatorstoevaluatetheevolutionofglobalandAsiansupplychaintrade,withaviewtotestingpopularnarrativessuchasdecoupling,near-shoringanddeglobalization.WethenidentifiedgrowthhotspotsinAsiaandanalyzedtheircompetitivepositioningusingtheHinrich-IMDSTI.Globalsupplychainscontinuetheirexpansion2.1GlobalIGtradehasrisendespiteadifficultperiodOurdatarevealsthatglobalIGtradegrewatanaverageannualizedrateof6%overtheperiod2018-22.Thisrobustexpansionimpliesthatpopularnarrativesarounddeglobalizationandtherollingbackofinternationalsupplychainnetworksmaybepremature,attheleast.Thatsaid,thetrajectoryofIGtradewasfarfromlinearoverthisperiod,reflectingtheimpactofmajorworldeventssuchastheUS-Chinatradewar,thepandemic,andtheRussia-Ukrainewar.Whencomparedtoaggregatetradeingoods,IGsaccountedforroughlyhalfoftotaltradeflows-asharethathasstayedbroadlystableoverthepastdecade.WefindthatChinawasthelargestimporterandexporterofIGintheworldoverthe2018-22period(Figure2).UnderpinningthisdominanceisChina'songoingimportanceinthefinalassemblystagesofglobalproductionasthezFactoryoftheWorld*.Atthesametime,italsoatteststothemanufacturingcapabilityofChineseindustries,wherelocalproducersareupgradingverticallyacrossvaluechainstoproducemoresophisticatedandscale-sensitivecomponents.Forexample,Chinanowaccountsforatleasthalfofproductionofbatterycellsandmorethan70%insomerelatedcomponents.2Figure1-EvolutionofglobalIGtrade,2018-2022100=2018levelSource:OxfordEnomicsSource:OxfordEconomicsFigure2-IGexportsbyeconomy,2018-2022average(inbillionUS$)22Near-shoringhasnotmaterializedatthegloballevelInmostregions,producersaresourcingagreatershareoftheirinternationalinputsfromoutsidetheirownregion.Intra-regionalsourcing,asmeasuredbytheshareofintra-regionaltradeineachregion,sIGimports,alsodeclinedinmostregionsoverthesampleperiod.Thispatternholdsevenwhenexcludingprimaryproducts(typicallyunprocessednaturalresources).TheAsia-Pacificistheonlyexceptionwhereregionalsourcinghasincreasedbetween2018and2022,butthisshiftwasrelativelyminor-theintra-regionalshareofAsia'simportsmarginallyrosefrom59.7%in2018to60.6%in2022.TheseresultsrefutebroadassumptionsthatglobalMNEsarealreadybringingtheirinternationalsupplychainsclosertohome,withkeyexceptions.Theapparentabsenceoflarge-scalenearshoringmaystemfromthe“stickiness”andtime-consumingprocessofreconfiguringsupplychains.Thisreflectsanumberofissues: Supplychainsaredeeplyentrenchedandhaveevolvedoverdecades,withestablishedrelationships,contracts,andinfrastructureinplace.Disruptingtheseestablishedpatternsrequirescarefulplanningandnegotiation. Thesheerscaleofglobalsupplychains,oftenspanningmultiplecountriesandcontinents,introduceslogisticalchallengesthatcannotberesolvedinshortorder. Reconfigurationentailssignificantcapitalinvestment,whichmanybusinessesneedtimetosecure. Regulatoryandcomplianceissuescanfurtherextendthetimelineforsupplychainreconfiguration. Supplychainadjustmentsalsoinvolveassessingandmitigatingpotentialrisks,suchaspoliticalinstabilityorshiftsinconsumerdemand,whichremainfluidandnecessitateagradualandstrategicapproachbybusinesses.Thesefactorsincreasetheset-upcostforcompanieswhenconsideringanyswitchesintheirsupplychains,increasingtheattractivenessofmaintainingtheirexistingsourcingstrategy.Furthermore,evenwhentheeconomicconditionsforthereallocationofsupplychainsareripezthesefactorsmaycontributetodelaysinrealizingsuchdecisions.Therelativelyrecentpick-upinMexico'sIGexportstotheUSpresentsanexampleofsuchalag.Mexicoiswidelyconsideredtobethebest-positionedemergingmarkettogainfromUSnear-shoringinvestment,givenitsproximity,well-developedmanufacturinginfrastructure,andestablishedtradeagreementssuchastheUnitedStates-Mexico-CanadaAgreement(USMCA).UsingUSmonthlyimportdata,wefindthatMexico'sshareinUSIGimportsremainedrelativelystablebetween2018and2022(withtheexceptionofMarch-May2020duringtheearlyphaseofthepandemic).However,whenextendingthedatatothefirsthalfof2023,wefindthatthepicturechangedsignificantly-sinceNovember2022,MexicohasovertakenChinaasthetopproviderOfinternationalinputsfortheUS.Itssharethereaftersteadilyincreasedfrom12.6%in2022to14.5%ofUStotalIGexportsbyJune2023.Figure4-ShareofUStotalIGimports(%)ChinaSource:OxfordEnomicsMexicoCanadaAsia'ssupplychainsareundergoingmajorchangesTheUSandJapanhavestartedtodecouplefromChina.Incontrast,China'simportanceasanexporterofproductioninputshasincreasedinothermajorcountries.3.1Chinaisdecoupling-butonlyfromtheUSandJapanOuranalysisindicatesthattheUSandJapanhavestartedtodecouplefromChina.China'sshareofIGimportsintotheUSfellfrom18.5%in2018to14.1%in2022.Inthefirstof2023,thissharedroppedfurtherto11.4%.Thelargestdropoccurredin2018-19duringthetariffescalationsoftheTrumpadministration.China,simportanceforIGimportsalsodroppedinJapanduring2018-22,fallingfrom26.5%to24%.ThisshiftreflectsJapan'scommitmentto”de-risking",exemplifiedbythepledgeofG7leadersinHiroshimainMay2023?Inparticular,JapansetupaUS$20billionfundtoattractinvestmentinthesemiconductorindustryaswellasrestrictexportsof23typesofsemiconductormanufacturingequipment-aligningitstechnologytradecontrolswithUSmeasures.4Incontrast,China'simportanceasanexporterofproductioninputshasincreasedinothermajorcountries.Between2018and2022,China'sshareoftotalIGimportsincreasedfrom11.1%to15.9%inGermany,from22.2%to26.4%inBrazil,andfrom29.5%to33.1%inAustralia.Analysisofsectoraltradedatasuggeststhatthisgrowthw